While it is well known that insider trading transfers wealth from uninformed market participants to informed insiders, it is not obvious whether insider trading bring welfare effect. This paper explores an answer to this issue, employing stock trading data around SEO in Japan. An announcement of SEO usually decreases the stock price of the issuing company, creating an opportunity for insiders to sell short before the announcement and to make benefit. If this short sale before the announcement lowers the final offering price, the insider trading reduced the financing amount of the issuing company and we can say that the insider trading caused a welfare loss. The paper tests whether this prediction holds employing Japanese stock market data. The paper does not find welfare loss caused by insider trading around SEO.
Introduction
In 2012, Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC, Japanese version of SEC) charged several institutional investors with committing insider trading. Even before the 2012 cases, many market participants believed that there were many insider trading cases around seasoned equity offerings in Japanese stock market.
As the pecking-order theory (Myers and Majluf (1984) ) anticipates, stock price usually declines after announcement of seasoned equity offering (SEO). This is also true in Japanese stock market (Hirose and Ooki (2009)) . Expecting this price decline, those who acquire the SEO information before the announcement can make money by short selling the share 1 . Especially, an underwriter who acquire the SEO information before its announcement has incentive to diffuse the information to its customers in order to attract more and more customers Although the reform is expected to deter insider trading around SEO, it is usually quite difficult for issuing companies to find insider trading and information diffusion behavior by underwriters and to establish such illegal behaviors. However, when SESC and FSA file a charge against insiders, they have power and authority to collect relevant information and it becomes relatively easy for the issuing company to bring a lawsuit against the insider and to establish the case. Indeed, some issuing companies are suing underwriters who have diffused the SEO information and assisted insider trading, searching for damages caused by insider trading around their SEO.
However, it is not at all clear whether an insider trading causes losses of issuing company. While it is well known that an insider trading brings wealth transfer from uninformed market participants to informed insiders and destroys the fair trading environment and the public trust toward stock market, an insider trading does not necessarily cause decrease of social welfare. If an insider trading only caused wealth transfer among market participants and did not have any welfare effect, the issuing company would have no chance to establish its losses caused by the insider trading.
In contrast, if an insider trading lowered the offering price, which is determined based on the stock price on a specific date (usually one to three weeks after the announcement of SEO), the issuing company could argue that the insider trading decreased the financing amount, which is determined by the number of shares and the offering price. It could argue that the hypothetical financing amount without the insider trading would be higher than the realized financing amount 3 with the insider trading and that the difference between them is the losses it suffered.
Of course, the decrease of financing amount through SEO does not constitute direct welfare loss by itself. However, the issuing company, which has suffered the fall of financing amount, has two alternatives: to refrain from implementing planned projects or to embark on other financing methods, such as another SEO and bank loan. When the issuing company chooses to stop a new project, it creates welfare loss. When the issuing company chooses to engage in another finance, it involves additional financing cost. In both cases, the decrease of financing amount lowers the social welfare. Thus, it is important to know whether insider trading around SEO reduces the offering price.
This paper explores whether such welfare loss really exists employing the stock market data 4 . This analysis is not only theoretically important, but also provides solutions to 3 Note that the financing amount is determined by the offering price times the number of newly issued stocks. And the number of newly issued stocks is usually fixed at the timing of announcement. When the offering price declines, the financing amount also decreases. 4 There exists other type of welfare loss caused by insider trading, such as impaired trust of individual investors and their escape from stock market. However, it is difficult to quantify such type of welfare loss and this paper focuses on more direct type of welfare loss. several lawsuits pending in Japanese courts.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, section 2 describes competing theoretical hypotheses behind this issue. Then section 3 explains the empirical strategy and section 4 introduces the data we employ. Section 5 show the result of the analysis and section 6 concludes.
Theoretical Background
When we consider whether insider trading around SEO decreases social welfare, two competing theories lead to different outcomes. The one is efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH) and the other is behavioral finance.
ECMH View
ECMH has three forms: weak form (price history is factored into the security price), semistrong form (public information is factored into the security price), and strong form (insider information is factored into the security price). Weak form ECMH and semi-strong form ECMH basically applies in US stock market and Japanese stock market. Also the securities regulation implicitly assumes semi-strong form efficient market 5 . In contrast, strong-form ECMH does not apply basically.
If semi-strong form ECMH holds, insider trading is not expected to affect the final offering price. It is true that insider trading does affect the stock price before the announcement date, because insiders short-sale the target stock and the stock price gets lower compared to the case where there were no insider trading. However, after the announcement of SEO, the information provided to the market is the same regardless of the existence of insider trading before the announcement. Then the final offering price is not affected by the existence of insider trading because the insider trading does not change the amount of information finally provided to the market (figure 1).
5 See the reference system and fraud-on-the-market theory (Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc, 134 S.Ct. 2398 (2014 ).
[ Insert Figure 1 around Here ] Therefore, ECMH (semi-strong form) predicts that insider trading around SEO does not have (negative) welfare effect, just transferring wealth from uninformed market participants to informed insiders.
Behavioral Finances View
In contrast, behavioral finance view can lead to different outcome. While there are various versions of behavioral finance, some of them argues that people have 'reference points' in mind. People do not compare availalble alternatives rationally, but rather compare alternatives based on their own reference points 6 .
According to this view, there is a possibility that market participants may accept the present market value as their reference point. When there exists insider trading around SEO and insiders engage in short-sale of the target stock, the market value at the timing of SEO announcement becomes lower compared to cases where there does not exist insider trading around SEO. Because this decreased market price sets the reference point for market participants, a new information delivered by the SEO announcement decreases the market price of the target stock as if there were no insider trading (figure 2).
[ Insert Figure 2 around Here ]
Then the existence of insider trading lowers the offering price and decrease the financing amount the issuing company can acquire in the end. Thus, under behavioral finance view, it is possible that insider trading around SEO has negative welfare effect.
Empirical Strategy
Whether ECMH view or behavioral finance view holds cannot be determined theoretically 7 . We need an empirical setting to determine whether insider trading around SEO 6 Anchoring effect, which predicts that people tend to make judgments by adjusting away from an initial piece of information ('anchor'), thereby creating a bias toward interpreting other information around the anchor, is a famous example of reference points. 7 The Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 2013 was awarded to Eugene F. Fama and Robert J. Shiller at the same time. Fama is the founder of ECMH and Shiller is the founder of behavioral announcement has a welfare effect.
The basic idea to identify the existence of welfare effect of insider trading around SEO is as follows. If we compare the cases with insider trading and those without insider trading, we can identify the causal effect of insider trading around SEO on the stock price of the issuing company.
Empirical Challenge
However, there is an empirical challenge to this strategy. Because we do not know whether there really existed insider trading in each case, we need another proxy, which helps us to differentiate between the cases with insider trading and those without insider trading.
The working hypothesis this paper employs in order to identify the existence of insider trading around SEO is to focus on the trading volume of the issuing company. Insider information, once provided to the market, tends to diffuse rapidly until the disclosure date. Then, even though the volume of short sale by insiders was small, the trading volume on and before the disclosure date 8 tends to be larger than the trading volume during the normal period.
In order to detect such abnormal trading volume, we employ an event-study like setting. First, we estimate a market model of trading volume, which employs trading volume data of a company as dependent variable and the market trading volume as explanatory variable. Second, we calculate abnormal trading volume of the target company stock and check whether there exists any statistically significant increase of trading volume before the announcement date of SEO. When we find statistically significant increases of trading volume, we categorize the target company stock as stock with insider trading, otherwise as stock without insider trading.
finance. 8 Note that the announcement of SEO (and other material information) is provided to the market just after the end of trading time in most cases.
Specifically, we estimate the following market model of trading volume:
where V it is the logarithm of trading volume of stock i at day t, V mt is the logarithm of market trading volume at day t, and ϵ is the unobserved error term. Because it is known that the distribution of trading volume is strongly skewed and taking its logarithm changes the distribution more normal 9 , we employ the logarithm form specification. The estimation window is from 62 days before the announcement of SEO to 301 days before the announcement (240 trading days). We calculate the standard errors from 1 10 and perform hypothesis testing. We test the daily abnormal trading volume from 14 days before the announcement of SEO to 2 days before the announcement of SEO. When we find statistically significant (at 5 % level) positive abnormal trading volume during the period, we categorize the stock as insider trading case, otherwise as no insider trading case.
In order to check the accuracy of our working hypothesis, we compare our classification results with the known insider trading cases. There are five insider trading cases around SEO charged by SESC so far: INPEX (Kokusai Teiseki), Nippon Sheet Glass (2 cases), Mizuho FG, and TEPCO 11 . According to our classification criteria, all of them are classified as insider trading case. Because SESC files a charge only when it has acquired sufficient evidence to establish the existence of insider trading, these charged cases only set the lower bound and there must be many other cases with insider trading but not charged by SESC. Our classification criteria covers many other insider trading suspicious stocks. Figure 3 compares the average cumulative abnormal return of three SESC charged stocks with that of stocks which are classified as stocks without insider trading under 9 Ajinkya and Jain (1989) 10 Unlike the standard event study methodology, this method does not include the information from the cross-sectional variation of abnormal trading volumes.
11 Note that Mizuho FG had shelf-registration and that SEO information had already been factored into its stock price. Therefore, we drop Mizuho FG from our sample. our criterion.
[ Insert Figure 3 around Here ]
As figure 3 illustrates, the three stocks which were charged by SESC shows stock price decline two days before the announcement day and further decline after it 12 . This figure has similar structure with figure 2, which probably has urged those three issuing companies to bring damages lawsuits against the insiders.
Calculating Welfare Effect
After identifying insider trading around SEO, we need to estimate its welfare effect. First, we calculate cumulate abnormal return of each stock, which is estimated by the standard market model. The estimation window is the same as 1 and the explanatory variable is the market index (TOPIX). Then we check whether there is any difference between the CARs of insider trading cases and those of no insider trading cases.
Data
The data we employed to estimate welfare effect of insider trading consists of stock trading data in Japanese stock market from January 2010 to July 2013. This is because the oldest SESC charged case goes back to 2010 and we suspect insider trading around SEO has been popular at least from 2010. In June 2013, the Japanese securities regulation was modified, although it went into effect in April 2014, and insider trading around SEO became more difficult than before.
From the SEO cases between January 2010 and July 2013, we excluded relatively small offerings and focused on offerings over 10 billion yen. In addition, we excluded two types of SEO from the sample. First, we excluded stocks with shelf registration, because SEO information is already factored into the security price by shelf registration and SEO announcement may not have significant influence on the market price. Sec-12 However, the difference between the two averages are not statistically significant (t-test with 5% level). This is because the number of SESC charged stocks is small (three).
ond, we excluded offerings by REIT (real estate investment trust), because REITs and company stocks can have different price mechanism.
Finally we get fifty SEO cases during January 2010 and July 2013. Among the fifty cases, five company do not have trading data for 301 trading days before the SEO announcement and we dropped them from the sample. Thus our sample size is 45.
Results
Identifying Insider Trading First, we classified our sample into stocks with insider trading and those without insider trading. Employing the event-study like method, we find 24 stocks are on suspicion of insider trading around SEO and 21 stocks are cleared of suspicion.
Welfare Effect
The results of our analysis is shown in table 1 and figure 4.
[ Insert Table 1 around Here ] [ Insert Figure 4 around Here ]
We do not find any statistically significant difference of stock price (cumulative abnormal return) between insider trading stocks and no insider trading stocks. Thus we can say that insider trading around SEO does not decrease the offering price nor cause welfare loss.
One of the reasons why we do not observe the difference between insider trading stocks and no insider trading stocks is that insider trading stocks show price increase just before the announcement date, though it is not statistically significant.
Considering the fact that insider trading around SEO invokes short selling, this price increase might seem strange. However, because most market participants do not know what is the motivation of the short selling before the announcement date, they are likely to interpret the increase of trading volume as a signal of private information. While some market participants expect the private information as value decreasing, others expect it as value increasing.
13 Therefore, it is not unreasonable that we cannot observe price decrease of insider trading stocks before the announcement date.
Concluding Remarks
This paper showed that insider trading around SEO only transfers wealth from uninformed market participants to informed insiders and does not have influence on offering price. In other words, insider trading around SEO does not have welfare effect and we only need to care about the wealth transfer issue.
However, the analysis of the paper is still preliminary. First, it is not a causal inference, just comparing different stocks between treatment group and control group. 14 We need another research design to identify the causal effect of insider trading around SEO, such as matching estimator.
Second, our sample size is small. The small sample size may increasing the standard error and make it difficult to find statistically significant effect. We need to add more stock data to our sample in the future. 
